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1. introduction
Guerrilla warfare is an ancient style of armed conflict that continues to be practiced
throughout the world to the present day (Guevara, "A Method" 266, Tzu 168, Taber 149-150),
and many countries and peoples have either taken part in guerrilla warfare or have sought to
counteract

irregular war with counterinsurgency

methods, for example the United States

(Anderson, Guerrillas xi ; West xiii; Guevara, G. Warfare 18; O'Neill vii-xi). 1 Guerrilla warfare
heavily impacts every aspect of society , ranging from the family unit to foreign policy decisionmaking. Only through properly understanding the motivations , strategies and nature of guerrilla
warfare will we be equipped to progress in terms of the social , political and economic aspects of
society that guerrilla warfare activities influence (Taber 16).
This study consists of an analysis of the guerrilla warfare theories and battlefield
strategies utilized by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the Argentine-born Cuban revolutionary considered
by most people as the premier thinker on the nature of guerrilla warfare (Anderson , Che xiii).
Guevara developed his Jaco theory of guerrilla warfare based on the mode of warfare used
successfully during the Cuban Revolutionary War, and then sought to replicate this achievement
in the The Congo and Bolivia (Guevara, G. Warfare vii; Guevara, "To Fidel" 375; Villegas 1).2
After a brief introduction on the nature of guerrilla warfare in general, this thesis proceeds to
analyze the theoretical writings on guerrilla warfare by Guevara , as seen in his seminal treatise

Guerrilla Warfare: A Method (1963). We then proceed to analyze his application of Jaco theory

1

Guerrilla Warfare continues in myriad locales around the globe (e .g. Mexico's group , the Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberaci6n Nacional, as well as other manifestations of this form of warfare) (MacIntyre 1-88; O'Neill vii-xi). The
Village, a product of the Vietnam War , portrays the realities of war and the tactics of differing armed conflict styles
- in this case, it depicts Vietnamese guerrilla warfare strategies and U.S. counterinsurgency methods.
2
Guerrilla Warfare, a manual written by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara provides a theoretical-practical perspective of
guerrilla warfare based on the experiences of the revolutionary war in Cuba . Reminisc ences of the Cuban
Revolutionary War walks the reader through Guevara ' s personal experiences and battlefield notes during the war
providing an in-depth understanding to Guevara ' s guerrilla warfare theories and ideology , based on the Cuban
Revolutionary experience (Moreno 120).
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as an on-the-ground guerrilla leader to evaluate the praxis of said theory during his guerrilla
campaigns in Cuba, and later on in The Congo. In our evaluation of Guevara's understanding of
guerrilla warfare and its application in situ in The Congo, this study seeks to determine where
battlefield applications of said theory were successful or not, according to the author himself, and
why he perceived them in that manner. We also hope to uncover what lessons may be gleaned
from both his guerrilla warfare theory and its praxis to provide an analytical lens through which
we may better understand

today's

insurgent /guerrilla methods. A proper analysis of the

principles and practices of guerrilla warfare is imperative to understanding the dynamics of
guerrilla ideology, as well as the resolution of the underlying conflicts at hand that lead to
guerrilla conflicts, in general.

2. Understanding Guevara's Foco Theory
Ernesto ' Che ' Guevara 's Guerrilla Wa,far e sought to develop armed conflict theory
rooted in the objective and subjective realities of the Cuban Revolutionary War for application in
terms of future battlefield situations (Guevara , "A Method" 268-269; Guevara, G. Warfare vii ;
Villegas I; G. March 3). Written in 1963, this manual provides a theoretical outline of the
essence of guerrilla warfare by addressing its fundamental purpose, principles, and the nature of
its combatants (Guevara, G. Warfare vii, 13-45, 49-91; Villegas 1). Its purpose is also to inform
and inspire others to rise up against their exploiters through revolutionary struggle (Guevara , G.

Warfare 13; G. March 3; Guevara, "Socialism" 250-252).

2.1 Guerrilla Warfare's Purpose
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Ernesto Guevara defines guerrilla warfare as "the basis of the struggle of a people to
redeem themselves " (G. Wa,fare 15). That is, Guevara perceived the guerrilla army as a
defensive movement rooted within the fighting masses with the purpose of interpreting and
fulfilling the people 's aspirations, with the guerrilla fighter as the vanguard of the people ("A
Method" 272; G. Warfare 16; "Socia lism" 247). The struggle is "a war of the people," where the
people fight for their freedom to liberate themselves when oppressive
maintained

authorities have

power against established law and have exhausted efforts for peace-making

(Guevara, G. Warfare 13-14, 16). The name the rebel leader uses in his manual adequately
depicts this definition of guerri lla warfare , which he referred to as the form of warfare utilized in
the "Cu ban war of liberatio n" (Guevara, G. Warfare 41 ; Guevara, "A Method " 278) .
Guevara did not believe a simple impulse was enough for a revolution , but rather that a
purpose /reason rooted in concrete social goals must be embedded within every guerri llero/a
(guerrilla combatant /fighter) in order to withstand the grueling nature of guerrilla combat and to
sustain the ongoing revolution (G. Warfare 14; 53-54 ; "A Method" 268, 273; "Soc ialism " 260).
An examp le of a primary social goal of the Cuban Revolutionary War was that of "agrar ian
reform" in which peasants joined the guerrillas to seek changes in ownership of cultivable land
and changes in social treatment leading to greater socia l justice

(Guevara, G. Warfare 17;

Guevara, Reminisc ences 30, 159; Taber 32). Social goals function as a catalyst for a dedication
to the cause during and beyond moments of actual combat because they stem from the peoples'
aspirations and desires. 3 In other words , they are social goals for and of the people (Guevara,
"Socialism" 247,258; Guevara , Reminiscenc es 30).

3

Voluntary work is something Gueva ra gave strong dedica tion to bec ause he saw it as a stepping- stone toward s
building Cub a's new society (" Voluntary " 238).
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2.2 Principles, Strategies , and Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare
Guevara's writings repeatedly emphasize a primary component of guerrilla warfare: the
people (G. Warfare 13-21; "A Method" 267; "Socialism" 252-253; Reminiscences 83). 4 In
"Guerrilla Warfare : A Method," he expresses that a "guerrilla war is a people's war, and it is a
mass struggle. To attempt to conduct this type of war without the support of the populace is a
prelude to inevitable disaster" (Guevara, "A Method" 267). Why would Guevara consider
guerrilla warfare a war by and of the people? In this text, the rebel strategist quotes The Second

Declaration of Havana , which states that the masses /rural populations in Latin America
constitute the majority of Latin American populations, exceeding 70 percent of a country's
population (Guevara, "A Method" 267). The Declaration also states that the masses earn their
"living as farm laborers for wretched wages , or they till the soil under conditions of exploitation
not exceeded by the Middle Ages" (Guevara , "A Method" 267) . Guevara considers guerrilla
warfare a people's war because the masses are the exploited peasants who when unified, make
up the bulk of the fighting force , and will fight for the justice they have always been neglected.
This was the case in the Cuban Revolutionary War, a successful revolution supported by its
masses (Guevara, "A Method" 267; Anderson, Guerrillas xi; Guevara, Reminiscences 257-272).
The Cuban experience not only provided Guevara with ideological principles on how to
conduct guerrilla warfare, but also a wide range of on-the-ground strategies and tactics for the
analysis, and the incorporation of said analysis, into his theory of guerri lla warfare. Throughout

Guerrilla Warfare and his Cuban campaign diary Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary

4

Citations included are from the many written statements where Guevara emphasizes the people being central to
guerrilla warfare.
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War, the following four strategies /tactics appear constantly, and are emphasized throughout
Guevara's writings: 1.) Organization and discipline; 2.) Knowledge of the terrain; 3.) Support of
the people; and 4 .) Mobility . Therefore , a brief overview of the importance of these
strategies /tactics to the success of the revolution is necessary.
Guevara identifies that, in order for the guerrilla band to ensure its survival and ultimate
goal of conquest of political power, the guerrilla must have organization and discipline ("A
Method" 272; Moreno 121). Guerrilla fighters must be strategically organized in all movements
to produce continuous blows, wear down the enemy while appearing to be everywhere at all
times (Guevara, G. Warfare 20, 22-23; Taber 3 I). Otherwise, unnecessary occurrences can take
place , such as what occurred in the Battle of Pino de! Agua of 1957 during the Cuban
Revolutionary War. Guevara writes that, "although it was a political and military victory, our
shortcomings were enormous. The surprise factor should have been fully exploited ... a false
order to retreat had been circulated .. .a lack of decisiveness was evident in seizing the vehicles"

(Reminisc ences 152). Among other mishaps , low discipline and organization within the guerrilla
forces can lead to mutinies among its troops . This was almost the case some time after
September 1957 during the Cuban Revolutionary War when a combatant in Guevara's guerrilla
band pointed his gun at another guerrilla combatant's head as if he intended to shoot; the gun
unintentionally went off killing the guerrillero (Reminiscences 156-157).
Along with organization and discipline , knowledge of the terrain also ensures the security
and continuity of the guerrilla fighters. To know the lay of the land gives the guerrilla the
advantage, ranging from attacking from zones difficult to reach to being able to move through
the terrain more efficiently and effectively than the enemy (Guevara, G. Warfare 32-33; Moreno
117; Taber 155) . Guerrilla combatants must have perfect knowledge of the topography because

Guadarrama 7
they will be outnumbered and will need to use the ground to their advantage (Taber I 55).
Guevara's written accounts of the Cuban Revolutionary War describe a situation in the Battle of
El Hombrito where the guerrilla troops were up against at least 140 regular army soldiers , well
armed for modern warfare (Reminiscences 139). The guerrillas not only had far less numbers but
also only a "handful of weapons" to fight with (Guevara , Reminiscences 139). In the Battle of
Santa Clara, the odds for the guerrilla troops were more disadvantageous: the ratio was one
guerrilla combatant against 10-15 Batista army soldiers (Guevara, Reminiscences 257). By
knowing the lay of the land, the guerrilla band can better and more efficiently determine when to
attack , where to hide , and how to use its resources (e.g. ammunition) to have the upper hand in
such scenarios (Guevara , G. Warfare 32-36 ; Moreno 117).
Given that guerrilla warfare is a people's war , the support of the people is vital to the
survival of the guerrilla movement: the masses facilitate transport , communication , supplies and
much more (Guevara , G. Warfare 17, 31-37 ; Moreno 118, 122; Taber 27). An inhabitant of the
region , a peasant , also has better knowledge of the terrain and can prove to be an exceptional
guide (Moreno

I 17-118 , 122). Experiences from the Cuban Revolutionary War show the

effectiveness of this strategy: "a peasant informed us that a large troop was preparing to ascend
the Sierra Maestra along the road to El Hombrito" (Guevara , Reminisc ences 135). Because of the
support of the people , the guerrilla movement was provided with valuable intelligence allowing
the guerrillas to get in position to attack rather than be attacked. In "Guerrilla Warfare: A
Method, " Guevara reminds us once again that "revolutionary power" is based on the support of
the people and therefore the needs and wants of the peasants must be attended to at all possible
levels (277).
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Lastly, a guerrilla band may develop different stages throughout its protracted war but in
nearly all of the stages, the mobility of the armed group remains a vital factor for its security and
survival (Guevara , "A Method"

276; Moreno

117; Taber

161). Based on the Cuban

Revolutionary War experience, the guerrillas start out as a small group that devotes itself almost
entirely to hiding and moving nomadically between the wildest and most inaccessible places
(Guevara, G. Warfare 88). As the guerrilla force grows in number, it then begins to camp out for
several days at a time , rapidly moving to another location when the enemy is near. Even when
the guerrilla band has reached a stationary state where its numbers are larger than ever before, it
maintains small groups that it can dispatch to other places of combat; that is, the guerrilla army is
constantly moving (Guevara , G. Warfare 88-89) .

2.3 Nature of the Guerrilla Combatant
ln his manual , Guevara expresses that the guerrilla fighter fights , "to change a social
regime that affects one ' s own world"-meaning

they fight against oppression and for social

justice ( G. Warfare 17, 52; Moreno 116; Taber 3 ). The guerrilla combatant is embodied as a
"social reformer" who is the bearer of the people's cause (Guevara , G. Wa,fare 17, 49-50) . The

guerrill ero/a is a protector who exemplifies the significance of the revolution in all s/he does,
always having rigid self-control, employing high moral conduct and discipline both within and
outside of the guerrilla movement (Guevara , G. Warfare 49-51, 52-65; Moreno 116). 5 The best

5

Among many other traits vital to a guerrilla fighter are benevolence and respect (Guevara , G. Warfare 52-53) .
They must be benevolent to defenseless prisoners and provide medical assistance to the captured wounded enemy
(Guevara , G. Warfare 53 ; Guevara, Reminisc ences 148-150). Guevara exemplifies these characteristics well in the
battle of Pino de! Agua during the Cuban Revolutionary War. When a guerrilla combatant kills a wounded solider
from Cuban Dictator Batista ' s army rather than providing medical assistance , Guevara reprimands the combatant
fiercely for "this mindless act of violence" who had seen his family killed by Dictator Batista's army (Reminis cences
148-149). Another captured wounded Batista soldier overheard Guevara's words and whenever a guerrillola wo uld
pass near him he would yell, " Don ' t kill me' "Don ' t kill me! Che says not to kill prisoners!" (Guevara ,
Reminiscences 149-150).
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guerrilla soldier is considered to be a peasant, for it is s/he who lives the daily burdens of an
unjust reality (Guevara, G. Wmfare 52) .
A guerrilla combatant serves as a "guardian angel" of the masses , leading them towards
"profound , essential changes in the social structure," and bringing about a new society through
revolutionary awareness (Guevara, G. Warfare 50-51; Guevara, Reminiscences 159; Guevara ,
"Socialism" 249-250, 252) . Guevara calls this process , concientizaci6n , an awakening of a social
consciousness among the people that, in the development of a post-capitalistic society, leads to
the creation of a "New Man" (i.e. new person/self with a new mindset , beliefs , and values)
("Socialism" 247,252 ; Spicer-Escalante 398). 6 As Michael Lowy states,

The dream of all great revolutionaries .. .. has been to change not merely 'the
world' but also 'man': the revolution, for them , is not only a transformation of
social structures , institutions , and regimes , but also a profound , radical, and
'overturning ' (umwiilzende) transformation of men , of their consciousness , ways,
values , and habits, of their social relations . ( 17)

It is the duty of the guerrilla combatant to instill the significance of the revolution within the
masses through concientizaci6n (Guevara , G. Warfare 51; Spicer-Escalante 398)7. S/he must also

6

In Guevara's original Spanish text of "Socialism and Man in Cuba ," he does use a male gendered form of the
"New Man." Given that Spanish is a very gendered language, this factor must be considered in the analysis of
Guevara ' s construct of the "New Man" as a gender-neutral or gender-specific concept (Guevara , "Socialism"
(1965); Spicer-Escalante 399, 405).
7
Depending on the circumstances , the guerrilla fighter's role may seem as a contradiction in Guevara's guerrilla
warfare ideology . His theory states that the revolutionary struggle is a people ' s war that of which thefoco (group of
conscious rebels) is the peoples' leader. The contradiction appears because the struggle is said to be of the people,
when it is led by a foco of conscious rebels who may not have emerged from the masses , such as Guevara himself
who was from an aristocratic Argentine family (Guevara , "A Method" 267 ; Moreno 118, 119, 130; Anderson , Che
xiv ; Taber 24) . In the case of Camilo Cienfuego s, a peasant who later became third in command of the Cuban
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provide a "revolutionary

indoctrination,"

infom1ing "the soldiers, peasants, and workers, who

have all come from the people , the justice and the truth of each revolutionary act , the goals of the
revolution , why there is a struggle" (Guevara , G. Warfare 139-140) . The guerrilla fighter is part
of a vanguard that awakens the masses' awareness of the necessity of their incorporation into
society, and their importance as the "motor of that society" (Guevara, "Socialism" 247, 252).
These revolutionary ideas, gleaned from Guevara's experience in the Cuban Revolutionary War,
are directly related to his later involvement in the revolutionary movement in the post-colonial
Congo.
Guevara's Jaco theory of guerrilla warfare , primarily based on the expenences

of the

successful Cuban Revolutionary War as noted above , outlines in essence that the conditions
necessary for a revolution can be created (Moreno 1 15). The use of a "highly cohesive group" of
organized guerrilla fighters , called a Jaco, emerge from rural areas and act as the catalyst for a
revolutionary situation (Moreno 115). The Ja co instills revolutionary consciousness

8

within the

masses , mobilizes the people and as the vanguard leads them into revolutionary action with the
ultimate goal of conquering political power (Moreno I 18-119, 129, Guevara , "A Method " 268,
272 ; Taber 43).

3. Guerrilla Warfare Praxis: The Congo
Having established the basis for Guevara's Jaco theo1y, we now proceed to apply his
ideas to his experience in The Congo. From the beginning of his writings on his experience in
The Congo, the rebel strategist describes his involvement within the Congolese guerrilla force as
Revolutionary War , the contradiction of the guerrilla combatant ' s role is not present because he rose from within the
mas ses and became one of his people ' s trusted leaders (Guevara , C. Wa,far e 7-9).
8
The fo co instills revolutionary consciousness through social class awareness and understanding, while providing
ju stice and protection for the ma sses wh en the repressive government does not (Guevara , "A Method" 268 ; Guevara ,
" Soci alism " 252 ; Moreno 118; Dodd " Focoism ").
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"a failure" (Guevara , Congo 15). Our task is to determine why, according to Guevara, the
application of Jaco theory was unsuccessful
establish

what objective

and subjective

in that country. In order to do so, we hope to

conditions

were present which led to Guevara's

assessment of the guerrilla campaign as a failure. Obviously, there are many conditions that may
have contributed to Guevara's

evaluation of the unsuccessful

on-the-ground

practice of foco

theory in The Congo. For the purpose of this thesis, wc will focus on the historical background
and the impact of racial divisions and conflicting geo-political interests on the awakening--or
lack thereof--of

a revolutionary consciousness among the masses in The Congo.

3.1 Necessary Objective Preconditions
Guevara believed all venues of action must be exhausted before taking up armed conflict
(G. Warfare 14; Moreno 115; Taber 25). When turning to guerrilla warfare as a last resort ,
Guevara expressed that there are certain preconditions

necessary to develop a revolutionary

situation (G. Warfare 14; Moreno 115) : "Objective conditions for struggle are provided by the
people's hunger , their reaction to their hunger, the terror unleashed to crush the people's reaction
and the wave of hatred that the repression creates" ("Cuba: History" 136). According to Jose A.
Moreno, such necessary preconditions result from: 1.) An illegitimate government; 2.) Tensions
that cannot be addressed through regular /legal means of action; and 3.) No legal action has
changed the situation (115). According tofoco theory , based on the historical background of The
Congo, certain objective conditions were already in place for a revolutionary struggle (Guevara ,
"A Method" 267). Unlike Cuba, The Congo was emerging from colonialism in 1960 . From the
late 1800s and early 1900s on , The Congo had been under Belgian rule (Hennessy 79-83;

Lumumba; BBC Democratic; Leslie 8; Nzongola-Ntalaja

26). Exploitation,

discrimination,
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killings, and other ongomg conflicts run deep in The Congo's

history (Nzongola-Ntalaja;

Lumumba; BBC Democratic). For example, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja depicts the economic
exploitation of over a century forced upon the Congo: "[I]n 110 years of mineral extraction, the
wealth of the country has not been used to the benefit of the great majority of its people. Since
the days of King Leopold, it has gone to serve the interests of the country's rulers and those of
their political allies and business partners in the international community" (28). The Congo as a
postcolonial

state resolved little of the country's

issues and remained a conflict zone. For

example, Joseph-Desire Mobutu's regime from 1965 to 1997, promised peace and stability but
instead governed "at the pleasure of foreign powers to the disadvantage of their own people"
(Nzongola-Ntalaja

141-145). The Mobutu regime was born during the Cold War era and was

brought to power through the external support of the United States and its allies (NzongolaNtalaja 141-143). 9 His dictatorship was to become synonymous with acts of assassination,
massacres of civilians, and banishment to penal colonies, among other atrocities (NzongolaNtalaja 141). Due to its history as a colonized nation and an area where outside powers have long
ruled , Guevara was convinced that The Congo had the objective preconditions necessary for the
emergence of a revolution ("A Method" 267; Congo 20) .
Guevara believed that the exploited masses shared common interests and goals, which
served as the basis for solidarity when fighting the enemy ("A Method" 267; Moreno 123).
Consequently, he perceived the nature of the struggle to be international, thus making it an
international revolution . As stated in his last letter to his children, Guevara believed that a person
must "always be capable of feeling deeply any injustice committed against anyone , anywhere in
the world" -that we must do what is possible to heal that injustice without limiting ourselves to
9

During the Cold War, these outside sponsors had thought that in order to protect and promote their interests in
Third World countries , a leader with no political base was better than one with a strong political position such as
Fidel Castro from Cuba or Patrice Lumumba of The Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja 142-143).
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political borders ("His Children" 371 ). 10 He felt it was his duty to continue the revolutionary
mission to fight against imperialism wherever it took him ("To Fidel" 375). Guevara believed in
his own leadership ability to lead an international revolution, which he expressed in a farewell
letter to Fidel Castro when leaving Cuba to continue the revolutionary movement abroad : "Other
nations of the world summon my modest efforts. I can do that which is denied you because of
your responsibility at the head of Cuba ... " ("To Fidel" 375) . Guevara viewed Cuba as the
revolutionary vanguard of Latin America and saw the successful use of guerrilla warfare in the
Cuban Revolutionary

War as an example to follow in other locations around the world

("Socialism" 258).
Guevara thought that the objective factors in The Congo were ripe for a cornrnittedfoco
to improve the country's

subjective conditions, of leadership and strategy, and initiate a

revolution. Indeed, the revolutionary situation in The Congo had already been developing for
some time (Nzongola-Ntalaja). African resistance against colonial rule had taken form in peasant
rebellions , workers ' revolts , and urban uprisings during the early to mid 1900s and with
"politico-religious " movements since 1921 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 42, 51, 60). Given the existing
objective preconditions in The Congo , the Cuban Revolutionary War experience, and Guevara's
internationalist

ideals, the rebel strategist left for the African nation in 1965 to offer his

experience and knowledge as a guerrilla combatant and help strengthen the revolution in the
country (Guevara, "A Method" 275 ; Guevara, "To Fidel" 375; Guevara , "Socialism" 258 ; Dodd
"Che" ; Nzongola-Ntalaja 13-60; Lumumba; BBC Democratic; Guevara, "Preface" 16; G. March
7; Spicer-Escalante 394).

IO Further exemplifying his international revolutionary spirit , on December 11, 1964 , Guevara addressed the
Nineteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in New York expressing that "[a]II free men of the world must
be prepared to avenge the crime of the Congo ," manifesting his internationalist position (Guevara , " United Nations "
321 , 326). He shortly later became an on-the-ground guerrilla combatant in The Congo in 1965.
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3.2 Subjective Conditions within The Congo
Guevara begins his Congo Diary1 1 cautioning the reader with a preface titled "An initial
Warning" whose first sentence reads "this is the story of a failure" (15). Guevara's

failed

assessment partially came from quickly realizing that he faced the enormous task of unifying a
country that had not reached "real revolutionary maturity" (Congo 22; G. March 11). That is,
The Congo did not have the necessary revolutionary consciousness required to continue an
ongoing revolution for the development of a new society and people (Dodd "Che"; Guevara,

Congo 22 ; Guevara , "Socialism" 252; Guevara, Reminisc ences 159; Lowy 17). An incomplete
understanding of the vital subjective conditions in The Congo, further aided his interpretation of
the experience as a failure. The Congo had not only deep racial divides but also conflicting geopolitical interests that played prominent roles in the revolution (Nzongola-Ntalaja).
When the guerrilla leader arrived in country , multiple liberation movements were taking
place at the same time (Guevara, Congo 18). The Congo was not unified under one revolutionary
movement , meaning that the masses were not united. A reason for these divisions was the deep
ethnic and racial divisions that existed amongst the Congolese population (Nzongola-Ntalaja
216-218 ; Hochschild 160-165; Hennessy 26). It is important to note that the potential for ethnic
conflict was already grounded in pre-colonial society through its historical roots of inequalities .
However, it was the colonial system that helped intensify antagonisms and rivalries among
different ethnic groups by intensifying the rigidity of the already established relations of
inequality (Nzongola-Ntalaja 218). For example, Belgian colonization helped strengthen ethnic

11

Guevara's published account of the liberation movement in The Congo was written in 1966 , at the end of his
participation in The Congo ' s Revolutionary War (G. March 5).
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divides amongst the Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi peoples (Nzongola-Ntalaja 216-218). In 1925, the
Belgian Congo annexed two African pre-colonial kingdoms, Burundi and Rwanda, which had
previously

survived European conquest

(Nzongola-Ntalaja

216). Belgium advanced

from

governing one territorial unit to governing three distinct areas as one colonial entity (NzongolaNtalaja 216). Although the Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi shared the same culture and language, an
increasing oppression under colonialism caused advantages for the Tutsi and disadvantages for
the Hutu (Nzongola-Ntalaja 218). This deepened the socio-economic inequalities already in the
societal structure, further instigating greater ethnic divides (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). 12
Racial divisions at times cut deeper than ethnic divides in The Congo due to its brutal
history of colonialism. During King Leopold's

rule , the economic interest in The Congo's

resources led to an atrocious exploitation of the local population. Take for example, the AngloBelgian India Rubber and Exploration Company that went to The Congo to collect rubber
(Hochschild 160). Gathering rubber was a physically painful and an arduous process (Hochschild
161). The laborers had to disperse deeply into wild rain forests , often travelling days to find fresh
rubber vines (Hochschild

160-163) . Who would do this strenuous work? Europeans found

needed labor for the rubber enterprise by implementing policies of hostage-taking of natives and
by severing their natives' hands , feet, and other body parts (Hochschild 161-165). Colonization
of the Belgian Congo meant that an African had no rights and a European's word was law
(Hennessy 26). Such memories remain raw for the peoples of The Congo (Hochschild 165).
12

The three social groups differed in social status and occupations, as well as physical characteristics (NzongolaNtalaja 217). Yet, neither race nor ethnicity distinguished the groups' level of influence and authority in pre-colonial
society (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). Rather , the "proximity and /or service to the royal court and its representatives in the
provinces" determined their ranks (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). The Twa had a low social status and were often
discriminated against (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). The Hutu had a middle social status since they had agricultural
positions and were clients of Tutsi nobility (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2 I 7). Lastly, many Tutsi were cattle owners who had
ties with the royal court and were involved in the court ' s matters of territorial expansion (Nzongola-Ntalaja 218).
Thus , with the intensifying of colonial oppression , the rigidity in these ethnic relations increased (Nzongola-Ntalaja
2 I 8).
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This situation posed a problem for Guevara because without the unification and support
of the masses,foco theory states that there cannot be a revolution as guerrilla warfare is "a war of
the people" ("A Method" 267). The intensified ethnic and racial divisions of The Congo differed
from those of Cuba where the guerrilla combatants and peasants of the revolutionary movement
also shared cultural, linguistic , and racial backgrounds (Nzongola-Ntalaja 216-218; Hochschild
160-165; Hennessy 26; Moreno 132). Instead of deepening existent divides-such
Congo--these

as in The

commonalities allowed the Cuban masses to become unified, despite the fact that

Cuba bad previously been under North American imperialistic influence (Perez-Stable 4-1 0;
BBC Cuba).
Jn analyzing The Congo's racial and ethnic divisions, we must remember it was a country
drawn up on a map by Europeans in the 1880s . Borders were set and claims without
consideration for the demographics of the population and the implications of such actions for
African peoples (Nzongola-Ntalaja 19; Hennessy 13-16; Hochschild 84-87). The population of
The Congo, instead of portraying a people , resembled a nation made up of many nations , with
approximately 250 different ethnic groups , deep tribal divisions , and a cruel history of slavery
forming racial divisions (Hennessy 10, 26; Nzongola-Ntalaja

14, 19, 20-23; Leslie 4, 68-71).

Guevara ' s Congo Diary portrays these historical tensions. For example, in regards to ethnic
relationships and tribalism be wrote the following passage: "The Rwandans and the different
Congolese tribes regard each other as enemies , and the borders between ethnic groups are clearly
defined. This makes it very difficult to carry out political work that aims toward regional union"
(Congo 35). This statement reflects the importance of historical occurrences and the roles they
play in contemporary realities in The Congo. Another example provided by Guevara's diary
deals with racial divisions within the country . The following excerpt describes when Guevara is
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subtly asked by one of the revolutionary leaders, Laurent Kabila, to provide black men to fight in
the liberation movements of The Congo: "On behalf of our government, I offered him some 30
instructors . .. He recommended
Afro-Cuban]"

[ ... ] it would be a good idea if the instructors were black [i.e.,

(Congo 20; G. March 11). Kabila 's key request to Guevara gives insight into the

country's racial tensions, reflecting the fact that race can matter within the revolution. With a
light skin complexion and European heritage, Guevara's racial and ethnic make-up also limited
him greatly in conducting guerrilla warfare in The Congo as well as unifying the masses , because
whiteness was historically synonymous with oppression (Nzongola-Ntalaja
Linguistic differences

further contributed

134) .

to the divides of the Congolese

(Nzongola-

Ntalaja 14; Guevara , Congo 42). In the Congo Diary, for example, Guevara writes that when he
arrived to The Congo, a widely used language was Swahili (42). Since the rebel leader did not
speak or understand the language , he was assigned an interpreter to be able to communicate with
the rebel fighters and leaders of the liberation movements , as well as with the peasant population
(Guevara, Congo 42). Language quickly became a barrier in Guevara's attempt to strengthen the
development

of the revolution (Guevara, Congo 42). Not only was meaning lost in language

translation but language also posed social class divisions amongst the people:

Swahili is a language with quite a rich and advanced grammar. .. Swahili has to
some extent become the language of conquerors and a symbol of superior power .
It is the second language of nearly all the peasants , but the backwardness

of the

region means that what they actually speak is a highly simplified "basic Swahili."
(Guevara, Congo 42)
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Guevara points out that the socio-economic status of a Congolese person directly correlated with
how

s/hc spoke

Swahili

(Congo 42). An incomplete

dialogue

existed

in Guevara's

communication with the population of The Congo but also within the people themselves.

13

This

aided in the lack of unification and the ineffective strengthening of the revolutionary situation,
the exact opposite of what foco theory prescribes (Guevara, G. Warfare 16; Guevara , "A
Method" 267, 277).
Differences in geo-political interests served as another impediment to Guevara's efforts
to effectively apply foco theory in The Congo. For a long period in the nation's history , these
interests had taken priority over the interests of the masses (Hennessy 10, 21, 23-24; NzongolaNtalaja 13-41 ; Hochschild ; BBC Democrati c). For instance , since 1884 The Congo has been a
playing field for the interests of outside powers, given its strategic location and wealth of natural
minerals and resources

(Nzongola-Ntalaja

94). First , during what became known as the

"Sc ramble for Africa," Europeans all wanted a piece of the cake: Africa's endowment of raw
materials

(Nzongola-Ntalaja

94; Hochschild

26-27). Then, Africa became the locus of

confrontation between the superpowers in the Cold War era, and most recently , during the PostCold War period , due to the interests of The Congo's neighboring African states (NzongolaNtalaja 94) . During the Cold War alone, the United Nations Security Council deployed an
approximately 20,000 member peacekeeping force to prevent a conflict between the Soviet
Union and United States (Nzongola-Ntalaja 94). The deployment was said to be "in response to
the threat posed to international peace and security by violent conflict in central Africa ," a
violence brought forth by the interests of external forces, in this case the U.S. and USSR

13

Guevara's limited French helped him communicate slightly better in locations where the Congolese masses had
some knowledge of French , but even so, much of the time he wondered if his revolutionary message was
communicated with the meanin g and depth he meant to attach to it (Congo Diary).
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(Nzongola-Ntalaja

94). Even with its independence in 1960, The Congo was controlled by

outside powers rather than by its own population (Nzongola-Ntalaja

88, 94-95; Lumumba;

Hennessy 79). For instance , in 1961 the U.S. and Belgium assisted in the murder of the first
democratically chosen Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba (Nzongola-Ntalaja 95; Leslie 23, BBC

Democratic). Remembered as the greatest hero of The Congo's independence (Guevara, Congo
20; Nzongola-Ntalaja 80), the following quote from the film Lumumba portrays this historical
figure as the voice of the people pushing for social justice for the Congolese masses 14 : "I'd given
voice to a dream of freedom and brotherhood. Words they couldn't accept. Just words ..."

(Lumumba) . Patrice Lumumba ' s death shows how The Congo was a pawn during the Cold War
and how the masses' interests came last to the interests of foreign powers in the African nation .
World powers and leaders within The Congo government had done little to unify the
Congolese people and better their daily lives. 15 Local political and liberation leaders too had
lagged in bringing the people together as one to instill solidarity to fight a common enemy. For
instance , during the early I 960s the political leaders of the Congolese province of Katanga
wanted secession (Nzongola-Ntalaja

32, 63, 66, 94-5; Lumumba; BBC Demo cratic). Various

interests were at play , given that Katanga was not only 16 times larger than Belgium , but was
also the main source of the nation's wealth and had much of the world's finance involved in its
activities (Lumumba; Nzongola-Ntalaja

20, 99; Leslie 18; Guevara , Congo 66). Liberation

leaders ' interests also turned away from the peasant's
revolutionary

cause. For example , Kabila , the

leader with whom Guevara chose to collaborate to strengthen The Congo's

revolutionary situation , rarely met with the masses, much less fought alongside them (Guevara,

Congo 18-22 , 41). The Congo Diary portrays how Kabila continuously kept revolutionary
14

The film , directed by Raoul Peck, portrays The Congo ' s independence movement of 1960 through the lens of
Prime Mini ster Patrice Lumumba ' s life.
15
There were exception s, such as Lumumba , who were dedicated to the cause of the people.
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combatants waiting for his arrival and leadership , which almost never came , as it was said that he
was attending socio-political matters (41 , 43 , 65, 77; Nzongola-Ntalaja 134): "Each morning we
heard the same old tune: Kabila has not arrived today , but tomorrow for sure , or the day after
tomorrow .. ." (Guevara , Congo 41) . Only once did Kabila show up to meet the masses during
Guevara 's time in The Congo , an occasion that Guevara described in his Congo Diary: "The top
man was at last in the theater of operations . .. His activity was intense , as if he wanted to catch up
for lost time ... " (64-65). Within five days of his stay , Kabila withdrew to lead the revolutionary
situation from a distance in the comforts of Kigoma , a city known for its prostitution and alcohol ,
and the city of Dar es Salaam , located in Tanzania , far away from the hazards of the revolution
(Nzongola-Ntalaj a 134; Guevara , Congo 25, 26 , 31, 43 , 64-65). Kabila's

revolutionary

leadership in The Congo differed greatly from that of Guevara ' s guerrilla praxis in the Cuban
Revolutionary

War. Reminiscences of the Cuba Revolutionary War offers a portrayal of

Guevara 's lead ership style wh en emplo yingfoco theory in Cuba:

"None of us want ed to fight , we did so out of necessity ... " (3 7);
"As we mov ed to tak e up our attack positions , our greatest concern was for the
civilians " (95) ;
'This wa s a very favorable position for us , where we could annihilate their
forward guard . . ." (177).

Such passages from Guevara ' s diary of the Cuban Revolutionary War , exemplify how the
guerrilla leader fought alongside his guerrilla combatants and was with them through every step
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of the struggle-a characteristic of/oco leadership he did not find in The Congo, nor was able to
develop.
Guevara's Congo Diary is replete with experiences that do not match the principles,
nature of the combatants , and the purpose that his /oco theory states. He describes the
revolutionary situation in The Congo as the following: "The fundamental character of the
People's Liberation Army was that it was a parasitic army that did not work, did not train, did
not fight, and demanded provisions and labor from the local population , sometimes with extreme
brutality" (38-39) . Throughout Guevara's written account of the struggle in The Congo, there is a
continuous , frustrating lack of organization and discipline among the revolutionaries. Near the
beginning , Guevara's distress came from many areas including the combatants' chaotic shooting ,
their wasting of ammunition , and their lack of following their guerrilla leader's orders:

Of the 160 men , 60 had deserted by the time of the engagement and many others
never managed to fire a shot .. .the Congolese opened fire on the barracks ,
generally shooting in the air because most of them kept their eyes shut while
pressing the triggers of their automatic weapons until the ammunition ran out.

(Congo 58)

Towards the end of Guevara ' s time in The Congo , troops continued to refuse to fight by
withdrawing from action on their own initiative , thus deserting the guerrilla band (Guevara,

Congo 148, 150, 156). Eventually, commanders within the guerrilla movement began to spread
rumors about the Cuban combatants questioning their legitimacy , furthering a lack of trust:
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The incident with the grenades ... was passed by "Radio Bemba" [word of mouth]
in a way that suggested the Cubans had placed the devices and that the Congolese
had fallen into the trap . Such outrageous stories were the specialty of Commissar
Bendera Fest6n , Commander Huseini . .. never tired of throwing insults around me.
(Guevara, Congo 157-158)

Such examples show that Guevara wasn't able to fully develop the principles of Jaco theory
within the guerrilla campaign in The Congo (Guevara , Congo). The Congolese revolutionaries
were not "social reformers " willing to die at any moment for the struggle, as Guerrilla Warfare
suggests (17, 53; Guevara , Congo 49, 54-55, 150, 156), nor were they the bearers of the people's
cause and protectors of the masses (50). Instead, Guevara described them as mercenaries (Congo
49) .
In The Congo , both the guerrilla combatants and the civilian population lacked the
necessary political-ideological development for the sustainability of the struggle (G . March 7).
They lacked concientizaci6n , a strong consciousness

of the liberation movement as an

ideological engagement , necessary for the development of a new society and a "New Man" (G.
March 7; Guevara , Congo 22; Spicer-Escalante

394 ; Guevara , G. Warfare 20; Guevara ,

"Socialism" 252, 256 , 260). Without the masses as a unified entity , according to "Guerrilla
Warfare: A Method ," the guerrilla struggle is bound to end in disaster (267). Guevara interpreted
his experience in The Congo in this manner: there was no unified group, which led to an overall
demoralization and the failure of the revolutionary situation ( Congo 15- 16).

4. Conclusions
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Ultimately, Guevara's Congo Diary shows that Guevara's ideals and values differed from
those of the Congolese. He saw revolution as an international fraternity of man fighting for
shared causes against a common enemy, with a focus on the development of socio-economic
status awareness - a developed revolutionary consciousness ( Congo 18-19). The Congolese rebels
did not perceive the liberation struggles through this lens. Rather , the main concern of the
various liberation movements in The Congo addressed race relations and conflicting geopolitical interests. Revolution for The Congo was a question of race and was for the purpose of
ridding their nation of an ever-present European colonialism. Subjective conditions were being
addressed instead of the ideologically based socio-economic awareness Guevara emphasized
(" United Nations" 326). Thus, Guevara could not represent what the people wanted or what they
stood for because of the subjective conditions present in the area . This demonstrates that
Guevara didn ' t fully comprehend the environment he was in, nor did he have deep enough
understanding of the oth er. He did not perceive the deep divisions that existed in The Congo due
to a person ' s racial make-up , nor did he realize that he could not lead a revolution in The Congo
because of the symbolic meaning of his light skin color. For the Congolese , his white skin was
synonymous with European colonial oppression. Guevara was so deeply engaged in his ideology
of an international revolution that it limited his realization that the subjective conditions present
in The Congo were unfavorable for his purpose and mission in The Congo: to create a guerrilla

joco , a small and cohesive group that could lead the revolution . The unfavorable subjective
factors limited the masses in their ability to engage in the process of developing a revolutionary
consciousness required for the development of joco theory in The Congo . Guevara's

Congo

Diary exemplifies this point, displaying the fact that the guerrilla combatants in The Congo were

Guadarrama 24
unable to reach an understanding of what it meant to be a revolutionary and, thus, were unable to
develop a foco -what would have been the vanguard of a revolutionary movement in The Congo.
ln the case of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's guerrilla campaign in The Congo, although the
objective preconditions were ripe for a revolutionary foco to develop, the subjective conditions
were the stronger, determining factors of the outcomes in the liberation movement. As liberation
movements continue today, the study of Ernesto ' Che' Guevara's theoretical ideology and praxis
of guerrilla warfare provide a framework that helps analyze the underlying reasons for this type
of armed conflict. Such an analysis is imperative to understand how this style of war influences
nearly every aspect of society, and how to better progress socially, economically, and politically
in those areas of society that the guerrilla band impacts.
The Syrian Rebels exemplify a contemporary guerrilla movement that can be analyzed
through Guevara's works in order to better understand their motives , purpose, and impact on
society. For instance , a New York Times article recently stated the following in regards to the
nature of the Syrian Rebels fight: "For many of the fighters, the new offensive had an especially
emotional character, of a sort played out often in Syria's displaced population : These were men
trying to return to villages from which they had been driven at gunpoint" (Chivers). Such
manifestations of rebel warfare prove that these movements still occur , frequently for the same
reasons that Guevara ' s theory stresses: power, corruption, social justice, and revolutionary
ideals. They also exemplify that an ideologically motivated people can triumph (Guevara , G.
Warfare 13; 15; 20, Taber 188; 190). As C.J . Chivers writes, "[s]everal fighting groups

collaborated under a formally unified command; their thrust across the flatlands made progress."
Thus, contrary to popular beliefs Guevara's/oco

theory did not end with his death, but rather the
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rebel strategist's revolutionary ideology and praxis continue to hold relevance well after his
death.
While Guevara's/oco

theory provides a revolutionary lens through which we can interpret rebel

movements, it is not a fully comprehensive report of irregular war. There are questions left
unanswered that may later provide fruitful research, such as looking into Guevara's idea of an
ongoing, international revolution. ls the consciousness required for the international revolution
Guevara envisioned possible for the majority of humanity? What is necessary to engage with and
develop that process of consciousness? Does an international liberation movement currently
exist? Another important area of analysis could be to distinguish where the line between guerrilla
warfare and terrorism lies. What makes guerrilla warfare different from terrorism? When do
characteristics of one mesh with the other? Also, is one more of an ideological engagement than
the other? These questions are relevant and necessary queries that both nations where guerrilla
movements are present or in development , as well as nations who face potential guerrilla
movements, must answer as irregular warfare of this nature is a historical constant throughout
human history.
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